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may be found at the end of the volume. In locating the appropriate notes, how-
ever, the reader is handicapped because the notes are arranged by chapter
number only, without referring to the various chapter headings which appear
on each page. As a result, when the reader wishes to find the source of a quota-
tion he must turn the pages back to find the number of the chapter he is reading
before turning to the notes at the end of the book. This requires two excursions,
where even a single one is often discouraging. After a few such experiences
the reader dispenses with the valuable source material which the book contains.
This fault, it seems, could be easily remedied in a subsequent edition, which
the work certainly merits.
HERMAN FINKELSTEINt
PLEADING AND JOINDER, CASES AND STATUTES. By William Wirt Blume
and John W. Reed. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952. Pp. xviii, 684.
$8.00.
THis book is designed for use in an introductory procedure course. I
should find it hard to review such a book without trying to think through
and state my notions of what the objectives of a beginning course in procedure
should be. This ought to help the reader appraise the review and the reviewer
as well as the book, and this is as it should be.
To my mind such a course should include a broad and fairly philosophical
analysis and evaluation of the objectives of legal procedure itself-its rela-
tionship to the meting out of justice according to the rules of substantive
law; the concept of procedural justice or fairness; the kinds of problems that
have been injected into the quest for procedural and substantive justice by
the shortness of life and practical limitations upon available resources; the
kinds of solutions that have been found for these problems; the recurring
patterns of reasoning about them; something of the history and the trends
of these solutions; and an appraisal of them in terms of objectives. The
teaching of the detailed procedural system of any one jurisdiction (even the
federal system) as a crystallized set of rules, I should think unimportant.
Yet I should give close attention to the details of the cases, statutes, and
rules chosen by the authors for treatment, in order to equip students with
the vocabulary; to train them in the use of close reasoning and attention
to detail; and to teach them the argumentative techniques which every
lawyer needs, whether his role be that of practitioner, judge, or reformer.
This examination should include a study of the tactical considertions facing
the parties in the various situations taken up in the course. Only thus, I
think, can analysis and appraisal of the broader problems be made concrete
and meaningful.
tGeneral Attorney, American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers.
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This interplay between the broad and the specific should stimulate the
student's thinking towards the most fruitful approach to procedural problems
throughout his professional career. It should give his mind a tough resiliency
that will stand him in better stead-in a world that is far from static-than
either a given set of rules or the flabby habit of overfacile generalization.
With all this in mind, let us turn to a treatment of this particular casebook.
Its coverage is fairly shown by its title. Part I deals with pleading. It starts
with the relation of pleadings to judgment and goes on to the statement of
claim, answer, and reply. Part II deals with the joinder of claims and parties
and includes a treatment of the union of law and equity (with its inevitable
problem of jury trial) and a section of 20 pages treating the prohibition against
splitting a cause of action ("Required joinder of Claims"). Part III takes
up objections to pleading and joinder (demurrers, motions, and the like).
Part IV is entitled "Reference Materials."
There is much in this book I like. On the whole, the individual cases are
interesting and, I should think, teachable. There is an appropriate number
of cases where decision on the merits is either thwarted or delayed because
of failure to observe a procedural requirement even where it is clear that the
parties have in fact received all the legitimate protection which the require-
ment is aimed at giving.1 There are cases which turn a reasonable enough
substantive result upon a harsh and quite unnecessary pleading point.2 There
are cases which contain an excellent analysis and statement of what may
be called a liberal point of view towards procedural problems.3 Often these
opinions are emphasized by the device of contrast.4 The cases dealing with
the jury trial problem caused by the union of law and equity are particularly
well-chosen though they are not all put together.; Many of the cases represent
the interplay of various procedural rules and concepts in such a way as to
make real their actual incidence.0
Throughout the book the authors keep to their promise to edit cases "only
to eliminate discussion of issues irrelevant on the procedural points."7 In
1. See, e.g.. Rhodes v. Sewell, 21 Ala. App. 441, 109 So. 179 (1926); Powers
v. Hardesty, 250 Ky. 522, 63 S.W.2d 616 (1933) ; Frogge v. Kansas City P.S. Co., 159
Kan. 687, 157 P.2d 537 (1945).
2. See, e.g., Whitmore v. Herrick, 205 Iowa 621, 218 NAV. 334 (1923).
3. See, e.g., Binzel v. Viehmann, 111 Mont. 6, 105 P.2d 187 (1940) ; Hppe v. Kap-
perich, 224 Minn. 224, 23 N.vWr2d 780 (1947) ; Byk v. Weber, l,'ti Misc. 45t0, to N.Y.S2d
426 (Sup. Ct 1946) ; Benson v. Export Equipment Co., 49 N.M. 356, 1,4 P2d 3 ,) (1945).
(1945).
4. Compare, e.g., case on p. 98, with that on p. 100; case on p. 214, with that on p.
226; case on p. 496, with that on p. 500.
5. See pp. 275-92, 335, 362.
6. See, e.g., Munro, Brice & Co. v. W'%ar Risks Association, Ltd., [19181 2 K.B. 78;
Fitzpatrick v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 1 F.R.D. 713 (D.N.J. 1941) ; Great Northern Tele-
graph Co. v. Yokohama Specie Bank, 297 N.Y. 135, 76 N.E.2d 117 (1947).
7. P. vi (Preface).
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doing so they have taken a broad and liberal view of what is thus relevant.
This I applaud. In my view much of the pedagogical value of the case method
may be lost by over-editing. Authors should, rather, go in the other direction
and supplement opinions with material (from the record or elsewhere) which
reveals, more clearly than opinions do, both the actual workings and the impli-
cations of procedural rules.
I very much like the idea of Part IV (Reference Materials). This has
some 50 pages of cases dealing with the common law formulary system, some
of the sections of the original Field (New York) Code interspersed with liberal
quotations from the First Report of Commissioners (1848), and the relevant
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The material on the forms of action gives
the instructor a chance to bring out something of the nature and the incidents
of the common-law system (at pretty much any point in the course he chooses)
so as to show the kind of imprint it has left on the course of procedure's
history and on professional habits of thought. It seems to me this is pretty
necessary. History can teach mere antiquarianism and it can mould the
student's thinking into vestigial and sterile channels, but it need not do either
of these things, and the excess of zeal to avoid them may well have gone too
far. After all, it is hard to see how a broad understanding of a system's char-
acteristics, vagaries, and weaknesses can be had without some knowledge of
its background.
I have no quarrel with the combination of pleading and joinder as material
for an introductory course of the kind I have in mind. My main quarrel is
with the treatment of pleading and objections to it. Even here the materials
could be used to teach such a course, but the arrangement and selection do
not encourage it. The Preface states that "[n]o attempt is made to distin-
guish among common law, equity, code or federal practices; the rules of
pleading are dealt with as a single system." Part III is treated the same way.8
I do not know whether this statement suggests that the book is meant to give
a still life picture of some imaginary composite "single system" of pleading
existing in America today, but the material is steered too nearly in that
direction to suit me. True, we do not have the different systems of pleading
mentioned by the authors in their preface, and I certainly do not advocate
a separate study of them. But it is also true that we are in the midst of
transition--or at least of a great battle as to whether there shall be tran-
sition-in this matter of pleading. The common law stressed the issue-form-
ing function of pleading and was marked by a formal rigidity that was per-
force sired by human needs to spawn a host of inconsistencies and fictions.
The Code was a revolt against much of this, and as part of the revolt it
stressed the pleading of facts. This emphasis often came to mean an insistence
on considerable detail in pleadings-an insistence frequently made harsher
by motions for greater certainty or for particulars-but also meant to be
8. P. v (Preface).
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tempered by freer use of amendments. All this was part of a procedural
system which had virtually no device except pleadings to do certain necessary
jobs: dispose of cases that should not be tried; narrow issues before trial;
and afford disclosure to the adversary. The recent trend has been towards
creating new-and it is hoped, better-devices to do these jobs and to de-
emphasize pleading. This has meant striving for greater simplicity, brevity,
and generality in pleadings, and the even more generous allowance of amend-
ment. The Federal Rules exemplify this trend in marked degree. But the
trend is resisted. The issue is not completely resolved.
Whatever view an instructor takes of it, he can scarcely ignore this struggle
so central in the current scene of American legal procedure. Teaching ma-
terials should be geared to give some sense of the sequence of recent events,
the trends, the competing considerations. Concrete example and the study
of specific rules should be interwoven with this. Here I think the present
book falls short. The authors present no cases vigorously championing the
view reflected in the federal rules and so ably espoused by Judge Clark.
There is little to point up the intentional departure in those rules from the
stricter attitude developed by some courts under the Code requirement of
fact pleading. The fullest discussion of that departure to be found in the
present work is the unsympathetic treatment given it in Gerber v. Schtte
Investment Co.,9 a case decided under the Missouri Code which adopted
some features of the federal rules but retained the requirement of pleading
"facts." The body of critical and analytical literature dealing with "fact plead-
ing" receives scant reference, 10 though there is an excellent opinion setting
forth the liberal attitude towards the earlier Code requirement. 1
The book offers virtually no treatment of the newer types of discovery
and other pre-trial devices.' 2 I understand the authors themselves go into
these devices fully in a later course on trials and appeals; whenever in the
introductory course "they take up a case involving the pleading of details,
they consider the desirability of putting the details in the pleading, the alter-
native being use of the rules of discovery."'13 This is all very well, but I
should prefer to give the students a little more background at this point so
they could assay the alternative they are asked to weigh. Of course, since
9. 354 Mlo. 1246, 194 S.W.2d 25 (1942).
10. Thus I find no reference to Cook's classic articles on the subject. Coo, S'tc-
;nents of Fact in Pleading Under the Codcs, 21 COL. L. Rrv. 416 (1921); "Facts" a:d
"Statewnts of Fact," 4 U. OF Cnr. L. Rrv. 23 (1937); see collection of citations in
CLARK, CASES ON 'MODEMIT PLEAD G 75 (1952).
11. Hoppe v. Kiapperich, 224 Minn. 224, 23 N.W.2d 7.0 (1947).
12. The authors do, in a note on p. 105, refer to the 194S amendment limiting the
motion for more definite statement (FEz. R. Crv. P. 12 (e)) and state that the "[i]n-
formation needed for preparation for trial must be obtained by discovery."
13. Communication to the reviewer from Thurman Morey, Executive Director, Law
School Division, Prentice-Hall, Inc., dated April 14, 1952.
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everything cannot be taken up at once in an introductory course, suspended
knowledge and judgment must be asked of the student about many things.
I am simply stating my value judgment that the kind of juxtaposition I
suggest is more likely to stimulate inquiry into matters of significant relation-
ship and essential function than is a merely chronological arrangement.
For the same reason I should prefer to take up the study of pleading
requirements together with some treatment of the relationship between plead-
ings and proof, the notions of variance and surprise, the availability of
amendment at various stages of the proceedings, and the more recent device
of disregarding the pleadings where issues have been litigated by consent.
Such a treatment is not invited, though it is permitted by the present ma-
terials. The very first case,14 for instance, involves a ruling that a plaintiff's
judgment is void for want of a complaint even though issues were framed
by an attachment affidavit and defendant's plea, were litigated at a trial, and
were decided on the merits. It would be hard to find a better case to open
up searching inquiry into the reason for existence of procedural rules, their
relationship to substantive law, the functions that pleading may perform, and
the question of what to do when there has been a slip in procedure but a
substitute performance of its functions. Yet we find little if any suggestion
of most of these problems at this point in the book, and not even a citation
of the several cases that look distinctly the other way.15 To be sure, there
are references to some of the possibly relevant ameliorating procedural rules
and concepts tucked away in the course of later opinions ;1O and perhaps the
authors themselves use this first case as a horrible example which motivates
students to quest after the better solutions which procedure has to offer and
which the course gradually unfolds. But there is danger that a less experienced
instructor may mistakenly take the case as simply stating "the rule" govern-
ing the relationship between pleadings and judgment in litigated cases under
the "single system" of modern American pleading.
By way of contrast, Part II of the book does distinctly suggest the kind
of treatment I have in mind. Here the materials are arranged, in respect to
each problem, to show the transition from mechanical common-law and earlier
14. Rhodes v. Sewell, 21 Ala. App. 441, 109 So. 179 (1926).
15. Contrast treatment of the same case in CLARK, CASES ON MODERN PLEADING 4-17
(1952).
16. Thus, for instance, the notions that variance must be prejudicial to be fatal,
that pleading defects may be waived by non-objection, that pleadings may be treated as
amended where issues have been litigated by consent, are all introduced in the course of
subsequent cases (see pp. 64, 82, 98), but in such a way as to suggest only rules of
specific limited application (which would not reach the Rhodes v. Sewell problem) rather
than as examples of an attitude towards the functions of procedure that well might be
projected into that problem. See CLARic, op. cit. supra note 15. More pointed suggestion
is, however, contained in some language in the opinion in Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U.S.
254 (1891), to be found on p. 8 of the casebook.
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Code tests for joinder to the considerations of trial convenience and the like,
which govern modern procedures. This is only to be expected on the part of
these authors, one of whom has written some of the most significant articles
there are on the subject of joinder.
FLEMING JAMES, JR.3
THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND.
Collected, and with an Introduction and Notes, by Irving Dilliard. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952. Pp. x, 262. $3.50.
MR. Dilliard has made a judicious selection from among the many pub-
lished utterances of Learned Hand. His volume contains some thirty-four of
them-beginning with a Class Day Oration delivered in 1893 and ending
wi6th an address made in 1952, only a few days before the speaker qualified
as an octogenarian. Although the utterances deal with a great variety of
subjects each is a characteristic bit of self-expression. It is always the man
himself who speaks. It is always the same literary style that charms. It is
always the same philosophy of life that is proclaimed-and this gives an under-
lying unity to the adresses, which otherwise differ greatly from one another.
The two most remarkable facts which the volume brings to light are the
maturity of the commencement orator and the youthfulness of the retired
judge. The man is a perfect product of his early academic training. His
philosophy of life at eighty accords so perfectly with that of the men who
dominated Harvard thinking when he was young that the volume might aptly
have been styled "The Spirit of Learned Hand."
To attempt a statement of his philosophy is a hazardous undertaking, for
his expositions of it I find somewhat elusive. He himself suggests that his
"views about ultimate values" may best be gathered from the latest of his
addresses. There the reader will find the following pas-cage:
"On what have we staked our hopes? Is it less than the thesis,
as yet quite unverified, that the path toward the Good Life is to
assure unimpeded utterance to every opinion, to be fearful of all
orthodoxies and to face the discords of the Tower of Babel; all vith
the hope that in the end the dross will somehow be automatically
strained out, and we shall be left with the golden nuggets of truth?"'
If this were merely a commendation of tolerance of the opinions of others, it
might readily be heeded by a convinced believer in (say) the teachings of
Nicene Christianity. But if it is intended as a complete statement of a man's
whole faith, one is left wondering how in practice it can prove itself to be an
effective substitute for convictions and fixed beliefs. As a statement of judicial
-Lafayette S. Foster Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. P. 257.
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